An informer’s tale by Booth, John
An informer's tale
by John Booth
John Booth here examines the management by the Inland Revenue of a false 
informer. The subsequent failure of the Inland Revenue to either apologise 
to the informer's victim or provide compensation for worry, inconvenience 
and expense is also considered.
U nder the thirty-year (copyright) rule, contemporary information from government departments is restricted, but through the Reports (with evidence) of 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration's Select 
Committee ('the Committee') into taxpayers' complaints, 
departmental procedures and explanations are published. The 
report into Case No C.126/J (1974-75 HC 49 XXIX, 585) is 
one such case. It showed the Inland Revenue's error of judgment 
over the management of the information received and its refusal 
to apologise and provide redress. The outcome was a change of 
administrative policy over compensation; also revealed was an 
ambiguous policy over the protection of the identity of the false 
informer, frustrating an action in tort for damages against the 
Inland Revenue ('the Revenue').
The case is of interest not only because of the ambiguous 
position of the yiformer, but because the Revenue   having 
refused any compensation to the complainant   submitted an 
appendix to the Committee 'to consider compensation on ... 
the facts of each case'. It is considered here in the light of the 
report and the Committee's minutes of evidence (1974 75 HC 
454 XXX, f, Appendix; HC 454 XXI), which should be read 
together. The Parliamentary Commissioner (the 
'Commissioner') is clear that the Revenue enquiries were based 
on inaccurate information causing worry, inconvenience and 
expense, for which compensation was refused.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
The informer's involvement with the Revenue is complex and 
indicative of the criticisms reflecting the 'eccentric busy-body' to 
whom Lord Edmund-Davies later referred in D v NSPCC [1977] 
1 All ER 589 at p. 615f. In the summer of 1974, the informer 
'had seen a man painting a house' and, asking for an estimate to 
paint his own house, was given one price for cash and a higher 
one with a bill and cheque. The informer then made his own 
enquiries and reported it to the Revenue.
The Commissioner accepted the inspector's duty to follow up 
information, required where an inspector, if dissatisfied with a 
return, 'may make an assessment to the best of his judgment'. In 
1968, a Select Committee was shown to have thought that help 
for an individual was needed regarding a rigorous inspector 
where 'discretion is of the highest importance' (1968 69 HC
101-ii, XII, 541, q. 164). In 1986 the Financial Times advised it 
prudent to satisfy an inspector's reasonable curiosity, if he 'is not 
acting from an excess of zeal'.
The chairman of the Board of the Inland Revenue ('the 
Board') agreed with the Commissioner, before the Committee, 
about the 'peremptory' tone of the inspector's letter and 
criticism was made of the refused 'request to be seen in another 
district'. But the Commissioner also found that not 'enough 
consideration was shown to the complainant' and that 'a more 
courteous approach seems to have been indicated', suggesting an 
'excess of zeal'. The information received from the informer 
proved inaccurate, but the Revenue reported to the 
Commissioner 'the standing' of the informer, on which was 
claimed an entitlement to 'assume that the evidence was 
reliable'.
In the 1991 Taxpayer's Charter it is shown that the Revenue 
maintain a 'presumption of taxpayer honesty''. In this case the 
taxpayer (the complainant) was shown to have been employed by 
the Post Office, where character references as to integrity are 
required; his completed income tax return showed his only 
income to be from the Post Office. Despite these contradictions 
the Revenue continued to believe the informer, until the 
inspector visited the house which had been painted and, 
'following enquiries, he was able to establish that it was not the 
complainant who had done the painting'. A letter was sent by the 
inspector stating that he could not apologise for doing the job 
which he had to do, but regretting that the complainant had 
been troubled unnecessarily.
The Revenue were unabashed, claiming to the Select
' O
Committee that it was not the Revenue which had made a 
mistake but the1 informer, re-asserting that he was a 'person of
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some standing' and that the action taken was 'not unreasonable'.
ANONYMITY OR NOT?
Such was the disbelief of the inspector as to the protestations 
of innocence, that it was reported to the Commissioner that 'it 
might be necessary to ask the complainant to call, when the 
informer was present, or to supply a photograph'. Thus faced by 
his accuser, with identity revealed and the (alleged) privilege of 
anonymity overcome, it would then have been possible for the
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complainant to have considered a case in tort, for defamation, 
with damages.
It was a point taken up by the Committee. Mrs Kellett- 
Bowman MP asked:
Q. 'He would have a civil remedy, would he not? ... against the 
informant. I should have thought it was libellous?'
A. 'He would not know who the informant was'.
Q. 'You protect your informants?'
A. 'Oh,yes. We certainly would not tell him who the informant was'.
However, without an immunity certificate from a court, this 
was an assumed authority. The invitation for accuser (informer) 
and accused (taxpayer/complainant) to meet also appears to be 
an admission of willingness to exchange knowledge of identities, 
revealing the ambiguity of this 'protection' bv the Revenue. The 
Revenue were asked about the protection of anonymity given to 
an informer and commented that 'public interest immunity has 
its source in the common law rather than statute'. Although D v 
NSPCC was quoted as an authority, that case did not reach the 
House of Lords until 1977 and the Commissioner reported Case 
No. C.126/J in December 1974; this does not suggest close 
attention to detail by the Revenue. D v NSPCC was later 
important, however, as it was shown to have drawn some of the 
origins of anonymity from the protection of police informants 
which in Marks v Eeyfus [1890] 25 QB 494, 'had already hardened 
into a rule of law'.
MEDIEVAL GLOOM
The secrecy or the anonymity of informers was created by the 
courts with origins shown to be shrouded in medieval gloom   
giving unacceptable powers to the malicious informer without 
sanctions   and undermining legislative authority.
None of the immunity explanations were provided for the 
Committee, but the Commissioner did report the department's 
excuse of countering tax evasion, saying that without such 
immunity these 'enquiries into tax evasion, with [their] valuable 
policing effect, would tend to dry up'. This rationale had 
departmental origins in administrative convenience, rather than 
an analytic assessment of advantages. Neither was the inspector's 
suggestion, made at one stage, to arrange a meeting with 
informer and complainant commented on again. Such a meeting 
would have made a nonsense of preserving immunity.
The Committee did, forcibly, show their concern over the 
'problem of expenses ... to the taxpayer', specifically stating that 
'the case ... which has worried us is Case No. C.126/J'. The 
Commissioner had reported that the claimant had been told 
that 'there is no question of compensation from the Inland 
Revenue', concluding that he could only report that the claimant 
had 'been put by the inspector's enquiries to needless expense 
for which he can obtain no redress'. This had also been 
confirmed by a Treasury minister who 'refused any 
reimbursement of the solicitor's fees that the taxpayer had 
unnecessarily incurred'.
Before the Committee, the Board stated their opposition to 
reimbursement of expenses:
'where we inevitably go wrong should we then pay the expenses 
incurred by the other side? I think that this is very, very difficult'.
THE COMMITTEE AND COMPENSATION
Whilst admitting that '... this was a small affair', the Board's 
obduracy was excused on grounds that in complex cases some 
expense amounts involved 'can run into very large sums', 
making it difficult to pay 'in this case', but if the 'fees were in 
four figures, we do not pay'. This was an incomplete discussion 
because the Revenue 'excuse' of not paying in four figures was 
not a confirmation that the cases under discussion were in 
response to false informers, merely such as arise generally when 
'we go wrong'.
It was an argument again of administrative convenience; the 
Committee was not convinced, suggesting an ex gratia payment 
to meet modest expenses. The Board was also required to:
'look again, because these cases leave us very uncomfortable indeed. 
We see that a man who can ill afford legal jees has had to incur them 
and that is not to our likiny at all'.
On 5 February the matter was looked at once more and on 16 
June a letter from a Mr Price, representing the Board, was sent 
to the Clerk of the Committees and published as an Appendix to 
the First ReportJrom the Select Committee on 2 July 1975.
The letter considered compensation: 'typically, the loss will be 
in respect of compliance costs ... covering such things as agent's 
fees'. It was accepted that 'when the taxpayer's costs arise 
directly out of a serious error on the part of the Board itself, as 
a general principle 'it would be right for the Board to consider 
compensation ... on the facts of each case ... and this will be 
the Board's future practice'. It might have then been the Board's 
'future practice', but the change in policy was not made widely 
known and was not practised in tax districts. The letter of 16 
June 1975 was only discovered by a practitioner in 1992 from 
the advice of an inspector.
However, the Board's 'policy' of not paying compensation for 
department errors and mistakes was in contradiction to Treasury 
instructions dating from 1897. It is shown, in consequence of an 
examination by the Committee of Public Accounts of the 
1894 95 Appropriation Accounts, that the Board had been 
severely criticised over dispensing payments which 'they had no 
power to remit', (1897 HC 196 VIII, 5). A Treasury Minute was 
issued, which is the authority for all subsequent dispensations. It 
stated that:
'(2) A remission may be made injavour of individuals from motives 
of equity or compassion' ((1898) HC 261 VIII, 147).
It is suggested that all subsequent obstacles to payments in 
'equity or compassion' could have been made on such 
dispensationary authority and that Case No. C.126/J was such a 
case. The letter of 16 June 1975 disguised the fact that authority 
already existed. The subsequent Code of Practice accepted, 
publicly, compensation payments for which authority had existed 
  and been resisted   since 1897.
ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
The minutes of the Select Committee show the Board seeking 
to distance the department from its errors of commission. One 
error was that of the tenacious inspector, whose authority (under 
the Taxes Management Act 1970) is that 'he may make an 
assessment to tax to the best of his judgment'. Another was that 
of the district inspector who took over the case. It was not
correct for the Board to claim that the mistake was 'solely' made 
by the informer. The mistake, under statute, was the failure by 
the inspector to exercise the 'best of his judgment'; it was not 
good enough. To have escaped criticism the Revenue could have
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brought the informer within the Perjury Act 1911 bv a
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declaration, and then brought him before the courts, but that 
procedure was not followed.
Neither was it helpful of the Board's representative to add, in 
response to a question from Mrs Kellett-Browne (member of the 
Committee), that 'this is the sort of case where one would 
expect that the loss just lies where it falls'. It was nothing of the 
sort. The responsibilities accrued under s. 29 of the Taxes 
Management Act.
The Board's chairman interposed a hypothetical case of 
following up a bank certificate of interest received in the name 
of 'X' as, in his view, 'the circumstances here are not very 
different'. Those circumstances are totally different, as it is the 
Taxes Management Act which requires that:
'every person carrying on the trade or business of banking, shall, if 
required to do so by notice Jrom an inspector, make and deliver ... a 
return ojall interest paid or credited ... giving the names and addresses 
of the persons to whom the interest was paid or credited'.
Such statutory declarations bear no relation whatsoever to 
unsolicited comments from 'eccentric busybodies' and such 
comparison is not valid.
REDRESS IN TORT
It remains to consider redress for the complainant, which was 
denied. It was stated by the Commissioner that the complainant 
'can obtain no redress'.
The question of libel was raised by a Committee member; the 
chairman did interject, 'No, I do not think he could get a civil 
remedy'. The possibility of a libel action was not denied, only 
that 'he [the complainant] would not know who the informant 
was'. The case report stated that the inspector had said that 'it 
might be necessary to ask the complainant to call when the 
informer was present. The complainant said he would welcome 
the opportunity'. It is assumed that the Revenue would also have 
had the agreement of the informer.
The suggested meeting between informer and complainant is 
odd, implying a willingness to exchange identities. Had this 
taken place the complainant would have had the option of an 
action in tort for libel, slander or defamation. When asked, the 
Revenue did confirm that they 'will not disclose an informant's 
identity unless required to do so by a court order'.
Although the Revenue (erroneously) quoted the authority for 
anonymity in D v NSPCC, support for protecting an informant's 
identity did exist in 1973. Lord Diplock, in D v NSPCC in 1977, 
referring to Marks v Beyjus, took the view that the refusal to 
disclose the identity of an informer had 'already hardened into a 
rule of law'. But it is also shown that the precedent from Marks 
v Beyjus may not have been as sound as claimed.
It is well established that the policy of protecting the 
informer's identity is meant to protect from retribution. In D r 
NSPCC, Lord Denning quoted Home v Bentinck (1820) Br & B 
130, at p. 162:
'no person would become an informer if his name might be disclosed
in a court of justice, and if he might be subjected to the resentment of 
the party against whom he had informed'.
However, such a 'resentment' arose from protecting the 
informers of fabricated evidence under the Common Informers 
Acts for rewards on penal convictions   which brought the death 
penalty'   a resentment justly deserved. Wigmore's Evidence, 
revised by McNaughton in 1961 and 1972, affirmed the 
principle of protection, 'to avoid the risk of defamation or 
malicious prosecution', adding:
'That the government has this privilege is well established, and its 
soundness cannot be questioned'.
However, as identified by Cross and Tapper in Rogers v Secretary 
of State for Home Department [1973] AC 388, at p. 407, it was 
stated that evidence would be 'excluded on the grounds of public 
policy unless [its] production is required to establish innocence 
in a criminal trial'.
IMMUNITY OF AN INFORMER
The 'soundness' of the 'privilege of protection' has now been 
questioned. In 1982 lan Lagles in 'Lvidentiary Protection for 
Informers' [1982] Crim LJ (NZ), noted that:
'It should not be assumed that every scrap of information supplied to 
regulatory agencies or the police entitles the giver to have his identity 
concealed'.
Also in 'The Privilege of Non-Disclosure and Informers'
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[1980] The Irish Jurist, PA O'Connor had traced the aspect of 
executive privilege, or the refusal by the State to reveal the 
identity of informers or communications between them and 'law 
enforcement authorities'. A-G v Simpson [1959] IR 105, at p. 133, 
was quoted where, in a criminal case, Davitt P confirmed that:
'the Court will not ordinarily allow the name of the informer to be 
disclosed ... but may, if the needs of justice so require, direct the name 
to be disclosed'.
O'Connor also noted that in Marks v Beyfus in 1890, Lord 
Esher's opinion on the non-disclosure of an informer's identity- 
was that public policy 'which says that an innocent man is not to 
be condemned when his innocence can be proved', is the policy 
'that must prevail'. This conclusion suggests that the view of 
Lord Diplock in 1977, that the non-disclosure of an informer's 
identity' had (in 1890) 'hardened into a rule of law' was, in 
1973, less 'hard' than was supposed.
The question also arises as to whether or not, with the identity 
of the informer known, a case in tort could be brought.
MALICIOUS INTENT & INJURIOUS 
FALSEHOOD
It has been established that, despite Lord Denning's assurance 
in D v NSPCC that 'there is no proof that the informer acted
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'falsely and maliciously', others disagree that, in respect of 
malice, 'a desire to injure the plaintiff will usually be present'. It 
was shown that it was the inspector, by visiting the painted 
house, who finally established that the complainant was 
innocent, implying that the informer persisted in his allegations. 
But Salmond and Heuston show in Law of Tons, 20th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell (1992), that:
'if the statement is made maliciously, and is in fact false, the 
defendant is liable for it although he had good grounds Jor believing it 
to be true; malice destroys the privilege, and leaves the defendant subject 
to the ordinary law by which a mistake, however reasonable, is no 
defence'.
Such a position would not have allowed the Revenue to 
protect the informer.
Margaret Bra/.ier identified an issue common to all torts in The 
Law of Torts, 9th edn, Butterworths (1993) that 'to compensate 
those who have suffered harm through the invasion of their 
interests occasioned by the conduct of others', to which she 
added, on malice: 'though it is malicious, it will not be a tort 
unless the interest which it violates is protected by some tort'.
In the case under consideration the complainant was 
reported, falsely, to the Revenue, as carrying on a business as a 
painter. Salmond and Heuston discuss deceits and injurious 
falsehoods. The former was shown to be a false statement made 
to the plaintiff whereby he acts to his own loss. An injurious 
falsehood, however, is a 'false statement made to other persons 
concerning the plaintiff whereby he suffers loss through the 
action of those others'.
Brazier notes the 'similarities between injurious falsehood and 
the related tort of defamation', where there is a choice of 
remedy. By electing to sue in injurious falsehood the plaintiff 
obtained legal aid, unavailable in defamation, and the defendant 
did not have the right to trial by jury.
The Defamation Act 1952 provides for slander affecting official, 
professional or business reputation and slander of title 'or other 
malicious falsehood'. Brazier summarised some of the 
differences as follows:
(1) in defamation, truth is a defence if proved. In injurious 
falsehood the plaintiff must prove the untruth;
(2) in defamation the plaintiff has to prove malice only if 
rebutted by qualified privilege. In injurious falsehood the 
plaintiff always has to prove malice;
(3) defamation fails unless the plaintiff's reputation is 
besmirched. Injurious falsehood will lie even if his 
reputation is untarnished.
The most cogent factor affecting choice for a person of 
modest means would be the costs.
It is noted in Salmond and Heuston that the torts of injurious 
falsehood and malicious falsehood are equally acceptable. 
Section 2 of the Defamation Act was drafted in terms of 
'Malicious Falsehood' and was so used in the Report of the 
Committee on Defamation (1974--75 Cmnd 5909).
In Case No. C.126/J the complainant did lose   in respect of 
the expenses incurred   in proving this falsehood to the Revenue 
and improving his position as a postal worker vis-a-vis his 
employer, the Post Office. His contract of employment might
have been compromised, bringing disciplinary action from his 
employer.
It is interesting that Salmond and Heuston note that:
'no action for malicious prosecution will lie until or unless the 
prosecution or other proceeding has terminated in favour of the person 
complaining of it'.
It was shown that the Revenue eventually admitted that an 
error had been made, although they did not apologise, and the 
Commissioner confirmed the complainant's 'unnecessary worry, 
inconvenience and expense . . . for which he can obtain no 
redress'. This would appear to have met the conditions of 
terminating proceedings in favour of the complainant.
A further twist to this 'informer's tale' is also indicated by 
Salmond and Heuston. The Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s. 2(1) 
provides:
'Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Crown shall be subject to all 
those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a private person offull age 
and capacity, it would be subject'
when proceedings were instituted against the appropriate 
government department. It is therefore conjectured that, had 
the Revenue persisted in and raised an assessment, apart from 
appeals to the General Commissioners, the complainant's 
success might also have attracted an action in tort against the 
Inland Revenue.
CONCLUSION
A conclusion is that there is no statutory authority for, or 
apparent regulatory control of the informer for the Revenue, 
and particularly the false informer. The responsibility appears to 
fall upon an inspector's 'judgment', and that at whim. It is not 
an acceptable statutory position and does not provide 
accountability to Parliament.
There is a statutory provision 'at discretion' to make rewards 
for information received, and to provide accounts, although such 
payments are within the costs of collection and management and 
not separately identifiable. This is probably because of the trivial 
nature of payments set against total costs and revenues, as was 
shown from amounts of rewards paid, but there is no evidence 
as to the cost effectiveness of such payments and only a 
supposition that it is of any worth.
The secrecy or the anonymity of informers was created by the 
courts with origins shown to be shrouded in medieval gloom   
giving unacceptable powers to the malicious informer without 
sanctions   and undermining legislative authority.
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Without evidence of advantages and with little evidence of 
hindrance, it is suggested that the statutory provision for rewards 
should be repealed. In the absence of current relatively trivial 
rewards as motivation the informer might fade away. Future 
unsolicited information should then be brought within the 
provisions of the Perjury Act, or other declaration acts, as 
committees have recommended. The Revenue Department 
would then be able to escape from a twilight world of non- 
statutory administrative sanction. @
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